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which is estimated based on a panel dataset by applying the principal component analysis (PCA) 
to eliminate the multicollinearity problem. The results show that urbanization, liberalization and 
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importance of government policies aimed at enhancing further urbanization, openness to trade 
and industrial structural adjustments to sustain the growth momentum in China. The study also 
found that the potential for further enhancing growth through technical efficiency in China is 
considerable, which can be realized by deepening state-owned enterprises (SOEs) restructuring, 
and banking and fiscal system reform. 
Keywords: institutional reform, growth, technical efficiency, principal component analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis 
JEL classification: O11, O23, O47, E61  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu  publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
Preliminary findings of this paper were presented at Crawford School seminar on   
22 August 2006. We thank those participants who made useful and constructive 
comments at the seminar. We also thank Yuk-shing Cheng and Yanrui Wu for 
providing some data series for the study. 
 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that institutional reform plays an important role in enhancing 
economic growth in China.1 However, the ways in which various reform programmes 
impact on growth are complex. To shed light on how reform enhances growth, the paper 
decomposes the sources of Chinese growth by making a distinction between 
technological progress and technical efficiency (and the latter is assumed to be 
influenced by various kinds of institutional innovation) in the growth accounting 
framework. It then identifies a series of reform programmes, such as urbanization, 
industrial structural change, ownership reform, trade liberalization, and banking and 
fiscal system reforms as the key components in institutional innovation which facilitate 
the improvement of technical efficiency and through which economic growth. These 
components are then incorporated into the model specification, which is estimated based 
on a panel dataset by applying the principal component analysis (PCA) to eliminate the 
multicollinearity problem which is commonly associated with studies using multivariate 
approaches in examining the impact of reform on growth. 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section surveys the literature, which is 
relevant to the current study. The third section applies a technical efficiency model to 
decompose output growth and to derive the relationship between institutional reform 
and economic growth. The fourth section specifies the empirical form of the technical 
efficiency model with some instrumental variables generated from applying the PCA 
method. It discusses the panel data of 26 provinces in China from 1979 to 2003 on 
which the empirical modelling was based. The fifth section presents the estimation 
results with respect to the impact of eight institutional reform measures on technical 
efficiency and through which economic growth in China. The final section concludes. 
2 Literature  survey 
How institutional reform underlies China’s rapid and sustained economic growth is an 
ongoing debate. Krugman (1994), Woo (1997) and Young (2000) argue that China’s 
economic growth, similar to other newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in East Asia, 
had been driven mainly by massive injection of factor inputs due to the transfer of 
labour out of agriculture and the high saving rate. For example, Woo (1997) notes that 
the contribution of capital accumulation and labour force growth to GDP growth during 
the period 1979-93 was 6.2 percentage points accounting for 67 per cent of total GDP 
growth. Moreover, Young (2000) observes that the rising labour market participation 
rates, improvements in educational attainment and the rural-urban migration account for 
most of China’s GDP growth after controlling the understating inflation rate per annum 
(say, 2.5 per cent). Thus, they conclude that institutional reform affects China’s 
economic growth through enlarging the stocks of capital and labour. 
Other studies, such as Chow (1993), Borensztein and Ostry (1996), Fleisher and Chen 
(1997), Hu and Khan (1997) and Wang and Yao (2001), argue that China’s economic 
growth came mainly from technological progress rather than factor accumulation. For 
example, Borensztein and Ostry (1996) and Hu and Khan (1997) show, by employing a 
                                                 
1   The annual GDP growth rate was around 9.6 per cent during 1979-2003 (the State Statistical Bureau 
2005).   2
growth accounting method, that productivity had become the primary driving force of 
China’s rapid economic growth since 1978. Moreover, Fleisher and Chen (1997) and 
Wang and Yao (2001) investigate the impact of human capital and foreign investment 
on regional variations in productivity, and find that technological progress and 
innovation accounted for more than one-third of the total increase in output in the post-
reform period. As such, they conclude that institutional reform affects China’s 
economic growth through promoting technological progress. 
Kalirajan, Obwona and Zhao (1996), Wu (2003) and Cheng (2006) turn to use a more 
flexible form of production function to estimate productivity growth over time and 
across different regions. For example, Wu (2003) applies an extended Solow model to 
examine the role of productivity in China’s economic growth and found that efficiency 
changes (as an important component of TFP) played an important role in promoting 
economic growth especially during the period 1982-97. More recently, Cheng (2006) 
uses the stochastic frontier method with industrial data over time and across regions to 
decompose China’s output growth into factor contribution, technological progress and 
efficiency change, and observes that the significant efficiency change in regional 
production during the period 1993-2002. This study highlights, for the first time, a new 
way of capturing how institutional reform affects economic growth through its impact 
on changes in efficiency in addition to those contributions made through promoting 
technological progress and factor accumulation. 
Although previous studies have made progress in exploring the impact of institutional 
reform on China’s economic growth, none of them had attempted to decompose the 
contribution made by various institutional reforms to economic growth. The practical 
difficulty of doing so especially in applying multivariate methods is that different policy 
measures are usually highly correlated with each other and the problem of 
multicollinearity emerges in conducting empirical regressions.2 To deal with this 
problem, this paper applies the principal component analysis into a technical efficiency 
model to decompose contribution of eight reform measures to efficiency changes in 
China with the panel data of 26 provinces and metropolitan cities from 1979 to 2003. In 
doing so, this paper makes two contributions. First, it uses the stochastic frontier method 
to decompose the productivity growth into efficiency change and technological 
progress, and attributes the impact institutional reform on China’s economic growth to 
efficiency change. Second, it applies the principle component analysis to eliminate the 
multicollinearity of various policy measures in maximum likelihood regression, and 
distinguishes the contributions of various policy measures to efficiency changes so that 
the role of different institutional reform in promoting economic growth in China can be 
examined independently. 
3  The analytical framework 
The technical efficiency model, developed and applied by Coelli (1992), Coelli and 
Battese (1996), Kong, Mark and Wan (1999) and Coelli, Sanzidur and Colin (2003), is 
devised to analyse the production function for measuring the technology efficiency of 
                                                 
2   In reality, various institutional reform measures interact with each other in impacting on efficiency 
and growth. However, methodologically, we need to separate them out in order to examine how each 
measure impacts on economic activities and performance.   3
production. The core of the approach is to utilize ‘the specification in the production 
function which allows for a non-negative random component in the error term’ 
(Kompas 2004: 1633) to generate a measurement of technical efficiency or the ratio of 
actual to expected maximum output, given inputs and the existing technology. Applying 
this approach to analysing economic growth and its determinants, one can conveniently 
specify the relationship between institutional reform and efficiency change.  
Specifically, index country or region by i and time period by t, the mathematical 
specification of the stochastic production function for examining the technical 
efficiency with the panel data can be written as  
it it u v
it it it e L K f Y
− = ) , (  (1) 
where  it Y  represents total output, and  it K and  it L  represent the capital and labour stocks 
respectively. The error term  it v  is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed, ) , 0 (
2
v N σ  which captures the random variation in output due to factors 
beyond the control of a country’s or region’s production. The error term  it u  is non-
negative and captures technical inefficiency in the production function.  
Equation (1) enriches Solow’s dichotomy by attributing growth in observed output to 
movement along a path on or beneath the production frontier (input growth), that is 
movement towards or away from the production frontier, namely efficiency change, and 
shifts in the production frontier, namely technological progress (Wu 2003). If we define 
a frontier production level or the so-called ‘best practice’ output  ) , ( it it
F
it L K f Y = for ith 
country or region at time t given technology  (.) f , then any observed output with inputs 
( it it L K , ) may be expressed as  it
F
it it TE Y Y =  where  it TE  represents technical efficiency. 
Thus, Solow’s economic growth can be decomposed into factor accumulation, 
technological progress and efficiency change.  
Since our purpose is to assess the impact of institutional reform on technical efficiency 
in China since 1978, we can assume that technological progress is made smoothly over 
time. It is also assumed that technical efficiency is changing following the progress of 
institutional reform. Thus, the technical efficiency distribution parameter can be 
specified as: 
it it it z u ϖ δ δ + + = 0  (2) 
where  it ϖ  is the residual with the distribution of 
2 (0, ) N ϖ σ ,  it z  is a vector of specific 
institutional factors which influence technical efficiency of production, including in this 
study urbanization, structural change, ownership reform, openness to trade, inflation, 
financial market reform, government purchase and tax/revenue system reform. Given 
that these institutional reform measures are highly correlated in practice, we will use the 
principal component analysis (PCA) to generate eight uncorrelated instrumental 
variables to be used in regression.3 
                                                 
3   The PCA method was originally used in the field of face recognition and image compression, which is 
essentially a mathematical technique devised to find the underlying patterns or structure in data of   4
The PCA is to use a score matrix, derived from the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the 
covariance matrix of the given data, to transform the n-dimension (usually correlated) 
data into n orthogonal one-dimension vectors so as to eliminate their correlation in 
regression. In our case, we use the method to transfer vector  ] [ it z Z =  into an 
instrumental vector. 
The Eckart-Young theorem assumes that there exists the following condition 
Λ = ZU V'  for Z , where V  is a nxr orthonormal column-wise matrix, containing the n 
eigenvectors of Q,  U is a mxr orthonormal column-wise matrix, containing the m 
eigenvectors of R, and Λ is a real, positive, diagonal matrix (rxr ) which is the singular 
value of X. Now we can define matrix R, called the minor product, as  Z Z R ' = . This 
matrix has r  non-zero eigenvalues which, if Z  is properly standardized, will be 
identical to the covariance matrix of Z. From this, we can further demonstrate that 
'
2 λ I = Λ , where λ  represents a vector containing the r  non-zero eigenvalues of Z. In 
addition, the columns of U  contain the r  eigenvectors of Z. Because this analysis is 
closely related to the duality between R  and the covariance matrix of Z, we call this R-
mode analysis. It turns out that the columns of V  contain the eigenvectors of Q, also 
known as the major product ( ' ZZ ). 
Eigenvectors are all of unit length and the magnitude of them is given by the square root 
of the eigenvalues. If we multiply the eigenvectors times their singular values (i.e. the 
square roots of the eigenvalues), we obtain the factor loadings for each variable on each 
component. This is given by: ' λ UI U A
R = Λ = . The eigenvectors are a new set of axes 
(U) or basis functions. The projection of each data vector (matrix column) onto these 
new component axes is called its principal component score. Let matrix 
R S , which is a 
vector with the same number of column with Z  and we then have  
Λ = = ZU ZA S
R R    (3) 
Equation (3) shows that matrix 
R S  is essentially the same thing as Z  except that the 
factor scores have been scaled by the magnitude of the singular values. Thus, 
R S  can be 
used to substitute Z in the technical efficiency model to eliminate the multicollinearity 
problem.  
Substituting equation (3) into (2), the empirical function for assessing the impact of 
institutional reform on technical efficiency and then through which economic growth 
with the panel data can be written as:  
it
R
it it A u ϖ ϕ δ + + = 0    (4) 
And the marginal effects of Z  can be retrieved with the inverse of the score matrix.  
                                                                                                                                               
high dimension. Due to its advantage of reducing the number of dimension without much loss of 
information, the method has been widely applied into econometric regressions to eliminate the 
multicollinearity between independent variables (Stromberg 1997).   5
Finally, the assumption of  0 > it u  in equation (1) guarantees that all observations either 
lie on, or are beneath, the stochastic matching frontier. Following Battese and Coelli 
(1995), variance terms are parameterized by replacing 
2
v σ  and 
2
u σ  with  
2 2 2








=    (5) 
The technical efficiency of production in the ith country or region at the tth period can 
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where E  is the expectations operator. Equation (6) provides the basis for measuring the 
technical efficiency with the conditional expectation. The values of  it it u v − , evaluated 
at the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for the function, can be 
specified, where the expected maximum value of  it Y  is conditional on  0 = it u  (Battese 
and Coelli 1995). The measure  it TE  has a value between zero and one, and the overall 
mean technical efficiency is: 
2 ) 2 / 1 (
) / ( 1
)] / ( [ 1
u e TE
u
u u σ μ
σ μ φ









=    (7) 
where (.) φ  represents the density function for the standard normal variable.  
The above discussion has specified the theoretical basis for using the technical 
efficiency model with PCA method to examine the impact of institutional reform on 
economic growth through changing technical efficiency of production. Different from 
traditional growth accounting method, the technical efficiency model with PCA method 
not only allows for production below the best practice output but also eliminates the 
multicollinearity of various institutional reform measures.  
4  Model specification and data  
The paper chooses the model of Battese and Coelli (1995) to estimate the   
Cobb-Douglas stochastic production function for China’s economic growth. The model 
has the merit that determinants of the technical efficiency can be estimated together 
with the frontier production function by maximum likelihood method. Two empirical 
functions of the model are specified. 
First, if we assume that the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, its 
empirical specification can be written as:  
it it it it it u v L K t Y − + + + + = ln ln ln 3 2 1 0 β β β β    (8)   6
where  it Y  denotes the total output in region i at time t, t denotes time trend, and  it K  
and  it L  denote the stocks of capital and labour in region i at time t respectively.  
Second, the technical efficiency function can be written as the linear form of 
Equation (4). 
it it f f f f f f f f u ϖ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ δ + + + + + + + + + = 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0    (9) 
where  it ϖ  is an error term to account for random differences in the technical efficiency 
across different regions.  1 f - 8 f  denote the instrumental variable generated from eight 
institutional reform measures (or  1 Z - 8 Z ) as specified in last section using the PCA 
method. The coefficient of each reform measure can be retrieved from those in 
Equation (9) with the score matrix.  
The data used for the panel data regression cover 26 provinces and metropolitan cities in 
China during the period 1979-2003. The provinces and metropolitan cities include 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang. The data for the period 1978-98 come from The Comparison of Data in 
China: 1949-1998, and the data for the period 1999-2003 come from China Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
The total output is defined as regional GDP data, which are calculated from the official 
statistics with the 1990 constant price.4 The stock of labour is defined as the total 
number of people employed instead of manhours due to lack of data on the part-time 
and casual work.5 The stock of capital is defined as the total fixed assets used in 
production, which is calculated by using perpetual inventory method with the data of 
fixed asset investment adjusted with the price deflator. That is, given a rate of 
depreciation, δ  and the initial capital stock, 1978 , i K , the value of capital stock for the ith 
region in the tth year can be expressed as it t i it K K K Δ + − = − ) 1 ( 1 , δ . The initial capital 
stock  1978 , i K  and the depreciation rate are taken from Chow (1993) and Wu (2003), 
taking 1990 as 100 in determining the price deflator for fixed asset investment. 
The urbanization index is defined as the share of urban population over the total 
population. The industrialization index is defined as the share of the output value of 
secondary and tertiary industries over that of total output value. The ownership reform 
index is defined as the share of the industrial output value of non-state owned and non-
collective enterprises over that of all enterprises. The openness to trade index is defined 
as the share of total value of international trade, adjusted with the current exchange rate, 
to the GDP for each metropolitan and provinces each year. The inflation index is 
                                                 
4    For recalculating GDP figures for all Chinese regions, this paper uses official statistics with the 
adjustment of inflation as other studies did. For detailed discussions on measurement issues with 
respect to the Chinese official statistics, please refer to Ren (1997) and Maddison (1998). 
5  Since 1998, statistics exclude the laid-off workers, who were made redundant in the process of 
enterprise restructuring (Garnaut et al. 2005).   7
defined as the change of consumer price index (CPI) for each province and each year. 
The tax/revenue reform index is defined as the share of total tax over the total 
government revenues. The financial market reform index is defined as the proportion of 
the commercial loan over the total investment used for fixed assets investments. The 
government purchase index is defined as the share of government consumption over the 
total final consumption.  
There are two shortcomings with respect to the data collection method. First, there 
might be some inconsistencies between the data for 1978-98 and that for 1999-2003, 
since they come from different sources. For example, the statistical definition for the 
state owned and collective enterprises has been changed to be those enterprises in which 
state and collective have dominant shares since 1999. This will affect the magnitude of 
the ownership reform index. Second, not all metropolitan and provinces are considered 
due to data availability. The missing data for some indexes in some metropolitan and 
provinces for certain periods make the data an incomplete panel. 
5  The PCA method and empirical results 
The mean changes in technical efficiency of production in China during the period 
1979-2003 could be obtained by applying the stochastic frontier modelling approach 
(Equation 7) based on the panel dataset. Both the mean and variance of technical 
efficiency are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows clearly that although there are fluctuations, the average technical 
efficiency of production increases over time in China. This finding confirms that the 
improvement in technical efficiency as an important component of TFP (together with 
the advancement in technological progress) contributed positively to economic growth 
in China. The finding is significant in that the improvement in technical efficiency is 
linked to the institutional changes and reform undertaken since the late 1970s in China. 
Such finding provides some empirical support to the view that reform has contributed to 
economic growth not only through enlarging the stocks of capital and labour (as 
reviewed), but also by improving the technical efficiency of the economy. The latter 
helps move the economy from some interior point marked by inefficiency and wastes 
due to market distortion towards the production possibility frontier. 
Figure 1 also shows that the variances of technical efficiency of production decrease 
over time, implying that there is a trend of convergence with respect to across regional 
impact of institutional reform on economic growth in China. The falling trend of the 
variances of technical efficiency accelerates from the mid 1990s, reflecting the fact that 
reform has been deepened since then.  
The task now is to connect the improvement in technical efficiency with those 
institutional factors by adding PCA adjusted instrumental variables into the panel data 
regression. We ran a PCA on the original explanatory variable of macroeconomic 
indexes using the correlation matrix because of the large order of scale between some of 
the variables. The eigenvalues from the PCA are listed in Table 1 from which a score 
matrix could be derived to transform the data into eight orthogonal one-dimension 
vectors so as to eliminate the correlation between the instrumental variables in 
regression.    8
Figure 1 
Changes in mean and variance of technical efficiency in China, 1979-2003 
 





































































































































Source:  Authors’ own calculations 
 
Table 1 
The eigenvector for the PCA analysis on the macroeconomic reform indexes 
Component   Eigen value  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
f1 2.50  0.97  0.31  0.31 
f2 1.52  0.40  0.19  0.50 
f3 1.13  0.26  0.14  0.64 
f4 0.86  0.12  0.11  0.75 
f5 0.74  0.15  0.09  0.84 
f6 0.59  0.12  0.07  0.92 
f7 0.47  0.28  0.06  0.98 
f8 0.19  -  0.02  1.00 
Note:   It is shown that 2 f , 4 f  and  7 f  are not significant in technical efficiency model. 
Source:   Authors’ own calculation.   9
The correlation between the PC scores and the original explanatory institutional 
variables are given in Table 2. These correlations are also referred to as the PC loading. 
Table 2 shows that the variables UR  load heavily on  1 f ,  5 f  and  8 f ,  IN  on  1 f  and  8 f , 
PR on  3 f  and  7 f , OP  on  1 f  and  7 f , IF  on  2 f  and  6 f , FI  on  2 f  and  6 f , GP  on  1 f  
and  5 f , and TR on  2 f  and  4 f . Using the PC weights and the original standardized 
variables, we can produce the PC scores. Using the PC scores as the explanatory 
variables, we ran a panel data regression with the new instrumental variables and the 
results are reported in Table 3.  
Since that PCA selects the principal components as instrumental variables that are un-
correlated with each other, we have eliminated all the multicollinearity problems in the 
regression between technical efficiency of production and institutional reform in China. 
The estimation results show that the model demonstrated a slight diminishing return 
with respect to inputs as the sum of the coefficients for both capital and labour was 
smaller than unity. This result holds for both Model I estimation in which all eight 
components were included in the estimation and Model II in which the three 
insignificant ones (f2, f4 and f7) were excluded from the estimation. The estimation 
results of the technical inefficiency model passed the general and specific tests for its 
statistical significance and this is especially true for both capital and labour and most of 
the instrumental variables. 
Consistent with the findings of other studies, the coefficient estimations for both capital 
and labour show that capital takes more weight in production function than labour. It is 
also shown that technological progress plays a significant role throughout the period 
under study though it is not the focus of this study. Excluding the three insignificant 
components in Model II only slightly changed the magnitude of the estimated technical 
efficiency, suggesting partly that the estimated extent of the technical inefficiency is 
fairly stable (the bottom line in Table 3).  
Based on the coefficient estimations for the instrumental variables as reported in 
Table 3, the coefficients of each institutional variables can be retrieved (Equation 9). 
Since some of the variables are statistically insignificant in the regression, we excluded 
them when retrieving the real coefficients of institutional variables. The retrieved 
coefficients from the model estimation are reported in Table 4.6 
The figures show that urbanization, industrialization, openness to trade, and financial 
market reform, tended to increase the technical efficiency of production. Among them, 
urbanization exerted the largest impact on technical efficiency, suggesting that the so-
called ‘resource shift’ effect of urbanization not only transfers surplus labour from rural 
to urban areas thereby adding more labour to the total labour force, but also helps 
improve the overall technical efficiency of production. Given the current level of 
urbanization rate and the rapid pace at which it rises, China will continue to enjoy the 
                                                 
6   As it is a model for technical inefficiency which has been estimated, the variables with negative signs 
are those which contributed positively to the improvement of technical efficiency. Please refer to 
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix for the detailed results of such impact on technical efficiency over 
time and across different regions covered in the study.   10
benefit of improved technical efficiency brought about by the massive transfer of labour 
from rural to urban areas.7  
Table 2  
The score matrix generated for the PCA analysis 
   f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 
Urbanization 0.44  0.03  -0.46  0.09 -0.53 0.01  -0.18 0.52 
Industrialization 0.57  -0.05  -0.17 -0.01  -0.05  0.08 -0.24 -0.76 
Ownership reform  0.33  0.10  0.67  -0.21 0.10  -0.07  -0.55  0.25 
Openness to trade  0.44  -0.04  0.41 0.02 -0.23  -0.18 0.74 0.01 
Inflation 0.01  0.65  0.04  -0.24 -0.10 0.70 0.16  -0.01 
Financial market reform  0.08  0.58  -0.29 -0.35  0.25 -0.62 0.07  -0.01 
Government consumption  0.41  -0.13 -0.20  0.15  0.76 0.26 0.15 0.29 
Tax/revenue reform  0.00  0.46  0.14  0.86  0.03 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 
Source:   Authors’ own calculation. 
Table 3 
Estimation results of the inefficiency model, 1979-2003 
      Model I        Model II    
Independent variables  Coeff  Std error t-ratio  Coeff Std  error t-ratio 
C  -117.29 1.76 -66.74  -117.30 0.86  -135.78 
T  15.72 0.23  67.02  15.70 0.11  138.74 
K  0.71 0.01  80.60  0.72 0.00  229.60 
L  0.18 0.01  13.26  0.20 0.01  20.72 
f0 0.23  0.02  12.34  0.25 0.01  16.90 
f1 -0.10  0.01  -14.25  -0.10 0.01 -13.00 
f2 0.01  0.01  1.28  –  –  – 
f3 0.07  0.01  9.10  0.09 0.01  12.00 
f4 0.01  0.01  1.10  –  –  – 
f5 0.08  0.01  12.52  0.09 0.01  17.64 
f6 0.05  0.01  5.15  0.06 0.01  9.10 
f7 0.00  0.01  0.35  –  –  – 
f8 -0.08  0.02  -4.38  -0.05 0.02  -2.06 
           
sigma 0.04  0.00  18.78 0.04  0.00  26.22 
gamma 0.03  0.01  4.33 0.03  0.00 8.59 
           
Log likelihood  129.86  130.00 
LR 208.40  208.67 
Tech. efficiency  78.00  77.00 
Source:   Authors’ own calculation. 
Table 4 
Retrieved coefficients of institutional reform 
   URBN  INDU  OWNE  OPEN  INFL  FINA  GOVE  TAXR 
Coefficients -0.16  -0.03  0.02 -0.04  0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.01 
Source:   Authors’ own calculation. 
                                                 
7   The urbanization rate defined as the ratio of urban population to total population is about 43 per cent 
in 2005. It is expected that the rate will continue to rise in the next ten years or so reaching about 50 
per cent by 2010 and 60 per cent by 2020.   11
Financial market reform, openness to trade and industrial structural changes all had a 
similar level of impact on technical efficiency as far as their magnitudes are concerned.  
However, what matter here are the signs rather than the magnitudes of these variables. It 
is significant to observe that China’s continuous policy towards open trade, rapid 
movement towards an industrial structure where the primary industry share falls rapidly 
while the secondary and tertiary industries’ shares in the total economy continue to rise 
contributed positively to the improvement in technical efficiency.  
It may be surprising to see that financial market reform has already exerted some 
positive influence on technical efficiency, given that the task of reforming China’s 
banking sector is far from over. In fact, despite the existing problems such as high levels 
of non-performing loans associated with the banking sector, there is evidence that 
investment efficiency measured by the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) has been 
improving since the mid 1990s.8 The better utilization of capital may partly explain why 
there are some improvements in technical efficiency even though the analytical 
approach adopted in this study does not allow us to sort it out whether the observed 
technical change is labour or capital augmenting. At the same time, it can be inferred 
that more changes to China’s financial market by deepening reform in both its banking 
sector and equity markets could further improve the overall technical efficiency of the 
economy. 
The remaining instrumental variables including inflation, ownership reform, 
government purchase and tax system reform, tended to decrease technical efficiency of 
production. In terms of their magnitude, the impact of inflation was larger than that of 
others. Inflation could negatively impact on technical efficiency because the price 
distortion it generated does not convey the right signals to both producers and 
consumers for allocating their resources in most efficiency manner. The negative impact 
of both government purchase and tax system on technical efficiency illustrated the same 
point of the way in which resources are not being allocated efficiently, highlighting the 
importance of deepening reform in these areas.  
However, the question one should ask is why ownership reform, regarded as the core 
part of economic transformation, has some negative impact on technical efficiency of 
production. Possible explanations could be two. First, from the macroeconomic point  
of view, reform measures such as the state-owned enterprise restructuring, clarification 
of property rights, and national treatment of incentives, may ‘take longer to bear fruit in 
the aggregate and may generate a negative impact on growth as resources are 
reallocated across sectors’ (Borensztein and Ostry 1996: 227). From the microeconomic 
perspective, ownership reform has produced gains in terms of profitability but not in 
terms of productivity (Garnaut, Song and Yao 2006). Since the PCA regression has 
eliminated the effects of factor accumulation and technological progress which largely 
contributed to the rapid growth of the economy, this implies that ownership reform itself 
is yet to bear fruit in terms of generating the aggregate effect on efficiency.  
We now turn our attention to the impact of institutional reform on technical efficiency 
over time during the period under study and across different provinces in China. 
Figures 2-9 depict the impacts of the eight institutional variables on technical efficiency, 
 
                                                 
8   See Asia-Pacific Economics Analyst (2006).   12
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Source:  Authors’ own calculations for Figures 2, 3 and 4.   13
respectively with those impacts being marked by the solid lines. The two dotted lines 
above and below the solid lines are upper and lower bounds, respectively reflecting the 
variations of these effects across different regions. Smaller variances mean that such 
effects tend to converge while larger variances mean that they tend to diverge among 
different regions over time. Positive numbers mean that they are contributing to the 
improvement of technical efficiency and negative numbers mean that they are 
negatively impacting on technical efficiency.  
Figure 2 shows that the contribution of urbanization to technical efficiency is steadily 
increasing within a range of 4-6 per cent. However, there have been considerable 
variations across different regions with respect to the impact of urbanization on 
technical efficiency. For example, major cities such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai 
witnessed the largest impact resulting from urbanization while those relatively poor 
provinces such Guizhou, Gansu and Guangxi received relatively small impact on 
technical efficiency. There are some encouraging signs as the variances of urbanization 
effects across regions show a tendency of decreasing over time.  
Government regional policies in favour of those less developed regions and wide spread 
institutional reform to facilitate freer flows of labour across provincial borders help 
narrow the regional gap of development. However, the wide gap between the upper 
bound and the solid line suggests that China needs to accelerate the pace of 
urbanization, especially in those inland regions in order to have a more balanced pattern 
of growth. 
Figure 3 shows that the contribution of industrial structural change to technical 
efficiency has been steadily increasing over the period under study and the magnitude of 
such change was within the range of 2-4 per cent. There have been less regional 
variations as shown by the relatively narrow gap between the upper and lower bounds 
and there has been a trend that the variances of industrial structural-change effects 
across regions decrease over time. It is encouraging that those inland provinces have 
been characterized with relatively higher shares of primary industry as compared with 
those in the coastal regions. Narrowing the gap suggests that those inland provinces 
have moved gradually towards an industrial structure which allows them to enjoy more 
the benefit of improved technical efficiency. 
Figure 4 shows that China’s openness to trade has had positive effects on technical 
efficiency. A key feature of this figure is that significant differences existed with respect 
to the impact of openness to trade on technical efficiency across different regions. The 
figure also shows that the divergence has been enlarged especially since the mid 1980s 
as shown by the changing shape of the upper bound line as against the mean. The result 
is expected, as the coastal regions have benefited more from foreign trade than those in 
inland regions because of geographical, historical, and policy reasons. It remains a 
challenge for the governments at both central and local levels to deepen the reform in 
order for the gains from trade to spread across different regions. China’s accession to 
and conformity to the requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) help 
achieve this objective. 
Figure 5 shows that financial market reform has had some positive effects on technical 
efficiency throughout the period of reform, and such effects became considerable since 
the late 1980s. The variance of the impact is large, and different regions seemed to 
benefit from the reform differently especially since the beginning of the 1990s as shown   14
by the changing shape of the upper bound. However, as the variable for financial market 
reform was rather narrowly defined and no attempts have been made to trace the 
relationship between the size of bank loans and changing management through banking 
restructuring, some caution is needed to interpret this result.  
The remaining four institutional variables have had some negative impact on technical 
efficiency. The negative impact could mean that institutional changes and innovation in 
these areas have not achieved the goal of improving technical efficiency, but at the same 
time it also suggests that the potential progress and gains in improving technical 
efficiency by deepening reform in these areas could be considerable.   
Figure 6 shows the trend for ownership reform in influencing technical efficiency of 
production. There have been negative effects on technical efficiency throughout the 
period under study even though the negative impact has been relatively small. The trend 
had been persistent until the end of 1990s when it has been reversed. This is when 
China began to carry out wide spread privatization programme targeting the large 
number of medium- and small-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with noticeable 
improvement in firms’ profitability and sales (Garnaut et al. 2005).  
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It can also be seen that there have been large variances of such impact across different 
regions reflecting the fact that the progress in reforming SOEs has been uneven in 
different parts of China (Song 2007). However, since the variable for ownership change 
is too broadly defined, it may not accurately capture its actual impact of privatization on 
technical efficiency. 
Figure 7 shows that inflation has had some negative impact on technical efficiency and 
there have been no significant differences across different regions with respect to such 
impact. There have been cyclical changes over the sub-periods, 1979-83, 1985-86, 
1987-91, 1992-97, and the last subperiods saw the large fluctuations of technical 
efficiency in response to changes in prices. This synchronization of movements between 
price and technical efficiency highlights the importance of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability in the process of economic transformation to sustain a constant improvement in 
technical efficiency.  
The figure also shows that the pattern of change in technical efficiency has tended to 
stabilize since the end of 1990s and the impact has become positive over the latest 
period. This may suggest that China has entered a new phase of macroeconomic 
development since the end of 1990s in which changes in prices have become less 
volatile as compared with what had happened in the previous cycles. The 
macroeconomic stability could lead to an improved technical efficiency as prices reflect 
more closely the true scarcity of goods and factors of production in the process of 
marketization. 
Figure 8 shows that government purchase has some negative effects on technical 
efficiency, though the magnitude of such negative impact was insignificant, and the 
trend of the negative effect has been worsening throughout the period under study. The 
variances which reflect the regional distribution of the change tended to converge 
towards the end of 1990s but have begun to widen since the beginning of the century.  
The finding may be due to the fact that the ways in which government conducts its 
purchase or procurement are still not transparent and in conformity to the requirements   16
of the WTO. China is facing increasing pressure to open up its public sector market 
despite the fact that China did not make a firm commitment to do so according the 
accession protocol. The finding may suggest that improving the ways in which 
governments conduct public sector transactions could contribute to the improvement in 
technical efficiency of production. 
Figure 9 shows that the tax system reform has had some negative effects on technical 
efficiency, although the negative effect has been decreasing over time especially since 
the mid 1990s. However, it is observed from the figure that at the early phase of reform, 
China began with some wide regional distributions with respect to the impact of taxes 
on technical efficiency. In fact, some provinces were especially negatively affected as 
marked by the changing shape of the lower bounds by the two taxation system reforms 
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Source:  Authors’ own calculations for Figures 8 and 9. 
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which took place first in 1980 under the programme of ‘fiscal decentralization, and then 
in 1994 with a new revenue-sharing system. It is also observed from the figure that 
some kind of convergence has been taking place in recent years as shown from the 
falling gap between the upper and lower bounds from the mean.  
This finding raises the issue of how the taxation system reform impacts on technical 
efficiency of production, that is whether the two waves of taxation system reforms 
contributed to the two subsequent trends of convergences with some lagged periods 
(towards the end of 1980s and since the end of 1990s, respectively). However, this 
study does not provide a conclusive answer to this question. There is a general 
consensus that the current taxation system in China needs further reform and thus a 
more interesting question is how the future reform programme will ensure that not only 
the trend of convergence continues to take place, but also produces positive impact on 
technical efficiency of production across different regions. 
6 Conclusions 
The paper attempted to capture the impact of reform on economic growth through 
improved technical efficiency in China using the principal component approach. The 
main contribution of the paper is to have established the relationship between 
institutional change and technical efficiency of production. The results show that among 
these reform measures, urbanization, trade liberalization and structural change in the 
form of industrialization are the most important components in contributing to the 
improvement of technical efficiency of production and hence economic growth. Such 
findings highlight the importance of government policies aimed at enhancing further 
urbanization, openness to trade and industrial structural adjustments to sustain the 
growth momentum in China. The study also found that the potential for further 
enhancing growth through technical efficiency is considerable, which can be 
materialized by deepening state-owned enterprises (SOEs) restructuring, banking and 
fiscal system reform, and government system reform.   18
Appendix: explanation to acronyms used in this paper 
CPI  consumer price index, which is widely used as an indicator for measuring 
inflation. The CPI data used in this paper are derived from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks.  
NIEs newly  industrialized  economies, a term that refers to those Asian countries and 
regions with rapid economic growth during the past two decades including South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, some ASEAN countries, etc. 
PCA  principal component analysis, which is a widely used method in the graphing 
topology to eliminate the multicolinearity between independent variables. 
SOEs  state-owned enterprises, a term that refers to those enterprises with more than 50 
per cent of shares being controlled by central or local governments or collective 
legal persons. 
TFP total  factor  productivity,  which is defined as the total value of output minus the 
value of various inputs (i.e., capital, labour and intermediate inputs) in the 
growth accounting framework and widely used to measure technology progress 
and technology efficiency with the Hick neutral assumption. 
WTO World Trade Organization, which initiated from GATT since 1948 and is 
currently the largest multilateral free trade agreement in the world.     19
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1  
Impact of institutional reform on technical efficiency over time, 1979-2003 
 URBN  INDR  PRIV  OPEN  INFL  FINR  GOVP  TAXR 
1979 3.94  2.36  -0.39  0.18  -0.06 0.05  -0.22  -0.71 
1980 4.02  2.40  -0.42  0.22  -0.21 0.39  -0.22  -0.79 
1981 4.07  2.33  -0.43  0.23  -0.08 0.42  -0.21  -0.97 
1982 4.11  2.29  -0.43  0.23  -0.06 0.55  -0.22  -0.95 
1983 4.16  2.30  -0.45  0.23  -0.05 0.61  -0.23  -0.94 
1984 4.28  2.33  -0.51  0.26  -0.09 0.92  -0.25  -0.96 
1985 4.41  2.43  -0.56  0.34  -0.36 1.16  -0.25  -1.06 
1986 4.46  2.45  -0.60  0.39  -0.21 1.50  -0.26  -0.98 
1987 4.57  2.48  -0.63  0.52  -0.28 1.74  -0.27  -1.00 
1988 4.62  2.52  -0.67  0.51  -0.70 1.77  -0.27  -1.05 
1989 4.68  2.55  -0.67  0.49  -0.62 2.17  -0.29  -1.06 
1990 4.69  2.50  -0.69  0.61  -0.13 2.36  -0.32  -1.06 
1991 4.72  2.58  -0.71  0.69  -0.20 2.81  -0.33  -0.99 
1992 4.79  2.69  -0.76  0.74  -0.28 2.65  -0.34  -1.04 
1993 4.89  2.74  -0.86  0.72  -0.56 2.39  -0.33  -1.07 
1994 5.01  2.71  -0.98  0.99  -0.84 2.46  -0.34  -1.00 
1995 5.09  2.71  -1.01  0.94  -0.61 2.46  -0.33  -0.97 
1996 5.16  2.71  -1.11  0.87  -0.30 2.32  -0.33  -0.95 
1997 5.22  2.76  -1.14  0.87  -0.11 2.27  -0.34  -0.92 
1998 5.26  2.79  -1.24  0.83  0.02 2.42  -0.36  -0.89 
1999 4.99  2.84  -0.72  0.98  0.05 0.50  -0.38  -0.92 
2000 5.07  2.88  -0.68  1.16  -0.01 0.53  -0.40  -0.92 
2001 5.52  2.91  -0.80  1.13  -0.03 0.49  -0.44  -0.92 
2002 5.28  2.93  -0.78  1.32  0.02 0.52  -0.45  -0.90 
2003 5.48  2.97  -0.85  1.42  -0.05 0.54  -0.45  -0.88 
                
Average 4.74  2.61  -0.72  0.67 -0.23  1.44  -0.31 -0.96 
Source:   Authors’ own calculation. 
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Appendix Table A2  
Impact of institutional reform on technical efficiency across regions 
Prov\item URBN  INDR  PRIV  OPEN  INFL  FINR  GOVP  TAXR 
Beijing 10.15  3.25  -0.56 1.20  -0.28 0.32 -0.45  -1.04 
Tianjin 8.97  3.22  -0.90 1.88  -0.23 1.73 -0.33  -0.88 
Hebei 2.57  2.63  -0.96 0.36  -0.20 0.94 -0.26  -0.95 
Shanxi 10.96  2.89  -0.79 0.29  -0.22 0.65 -0.33  -0.92 
Inner Mongolia  4.99  2.42  -0.53 0.30 -0.24 1.79 -0.30  -1.25 
Liaoning 6.70  2.95  -0.80 1.12  -0.22 1.53 -0.34  -0.88 
Jilin 6.30  2.54  -0.54 0.45  -0.22 1.57 -0.26  -0.97 
Heilongjiang 6.87  2.79  -0.46 0.47  -0.23 3.08 -0.26  -1.08 
Shanghai 10.95  3.07  -0.71 1.49  -0.26 3.10 -0.30  -0.83 
Jiangsu 3.64  2.69  -1.24 0.91  -0.22 0.76 -0.28  -0.92 
Zhejiang 2.82  2.68  -1.34 0.80 -0.24 0.76 -0.25  -1.01 
Anhui 2.55  2.31  -0.83 0.24  -0.22 1.24 -0.22  -0.97 
Jiangxi 3.09  2.26  -0.66 0.27  -0.22 1.76 -0.30  -0.89 
Shandong 3.10  2.54  -1.04 0.68  -0.21 0.46 -0.36  -0.93 
Henan 3.19  2.49  -0.98 0.16  -0.21 1.21 -0.35  -0.93 
Hubei 3.70  2.44  -0.76 0.28  -0.20 1.56 -0.26  -0.87 
Hunan 2.59  2.27  -0.74 0.27  -0.26 1.13 -0.25  -0.86 
Guangdong 4.18  2.71  -1.19 4.08 -0.25 1.16 -0.30  -0.94 
Guangxi 2.32  2.21  -0.68 0.40 -0.24 1.37 -0.35  -0.89 
Guizhou 2.08  2.20  -0.48 0.18  -0.23 0.33 -0.27  -0.96 
Yunnan 2.08  2.36  -0.47 0.29  -0.22 1.41 -0.22  -0.96 
Shaanxi 3.11  2.59  -0.55 0.31 -0.23 1.24 -0.30  -0.92 
Gansu 2.71  2.63  -0.42 0.19 -0.22 1.98 -0.37  -0.94 
Qinghai 4.39  2.67  -0.35 0.20  -0.25 2.96 -0.38  -1.05 
Ningxia 3.88  2.62  -0.48 0.37  -0.23 1.88 -0.47  -0.99 
Xinjiang 5.32  2.36  -0.34 0.38  -0.22 1.51 -0.38  -1.02 
              
Average 4.74  2.61  -0.72 0.67 -0.23 1.44 -0.31  -0.96 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation. 